"It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies… Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points." — "X" (George Kennan), Foreign Affairs, July 1947
Critics like Walter Lippmann argued Kennan's framework was flawed because it:
- A
Ignored the importance of NATO as a military alliance
- Bcheck_circle
Committed the U.S. to defending too many peripheral regions where vital interests were limited
- C
Required a return to isolationism
- D
Underestimated the threat from Maoist China
Explanation
Lippmann's 1947 columns (later published as "The Cold War") attacked Kennan for making the U.S. obligated to respond at every "shifting" point on the periphery, leading to overcommitment — a critique later vindicated for many by Vietnam.